Mr. Landau, a builder, had just finished doing extensive renovations on Mr. Naiman’s house. When the time came for the final payment, a dispute arose over certain additional charges that Mr. Naiman refused to pay. Mr. Landau tried unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with Mr. Naiman, who adamantly refused to pay anything extra.

“I have no choice but to sue you,” Mr. Landau said.

“Go ahead,” said Mr. Naiman. “I am convinced that I’m exempt and am willing to litigate in any reputable beis din.”

Mr. Landau sued Mr. Naiman in Rabbi Dayan’s beis din.

“We require the two parties to sign a binding arbitration agreement, to make the ruling of beis din enforceable in civil court,” the secretary explained. The two parties signed the form.

The case was complicated. There were disagreements over factual issues with conflicting evidence; the Halachah was also subject to a wide-ranging dispute between the authorities.

The three Dayanim wrestled with the case, but could not achieve a clear-cut ruling. Two wanted to obligate Mr. Naiman 40 percent of the disputed amount as an imposed compromise, whereas the third wanted to exempt him completely. The three continued to deliberate, but remained entrenched in their positions and could not reach a unanimous agreement.

Rabbi Dayan announced to the parties: “In accordance with the majority view, Mr. Naiman must pay 40 percent as a compromise.”

“I accept the ruling,” said Mr. Naiman. “However, I have a question, if I may ask.”

“Certainly,” replied Rabbi Dayan.

“You said that the compromise ruling is based on the majority,” said Mr. Naiman. “While a legal ruling clearly follows the majority, I recall learning that compromise arbitration must be a unanimous decision; perhaps we should not follow the majority in our case!”

“Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch cites from a number of Rishonim that compromise arbitration requires unanimous decision of the arbitrators,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “They limit the Torah’s decree of majority rule to beis din, but other forums, which are based on the parties’ agreement, require unanimous decision to obligate a person in payment” (C.M. 12:18; Rema 18:1; Responsa Rashba 5:289).

“What is this based on?” asked Mr. Landau.

“The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 72a) addresses the case of a buyer and seller who agree that the price be established by a panel of evaluators,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “If they say, ‘As a group of three evaluate,’ it reflects a legal ruling that follows the majority, whereas if they say, ‘As three say,’ it reflects arbitration that requires unanimous agreement. Nonetheless, in most cases nowadays a compromise arbitration decided by the majority of the Dayanim suffices.”

“Why is that?” asked Mr. Naiman.

“First, when coming before a beis din for arbitration, you signed an arbitration agreement that authorizes the beis din to rule either according to the letter of the law or by imposed compromise,” explained Rabbi Dayan. “It is recommended that the agreement explicitly state the intention to follow even the majority of a compromise. Even if it doesn’t, some maintain that the compromise is implicitly made parallel to a ruling that follows the majority” (See Sma 13:20; Pischei Teshuvah 13:6; Aruch Hashulchan 12:15).

“Furthermore, the compromise imposed by the beis din is usually intended to be close to the letter of the law,” continued Rabbi Dayan. “The dispute between the Dayanim regarding the compromise often reflects a dispute over what the law should be, so that the majority of the compromise actually reflects a majority ruling” (Divrei Malkiel 5:10).

“Finally, some suggest that when the litigants initially came before the beis din for a judicial decision and the Dayanim encouraged them to accept imposed compromise,” concluded Rabbi Dayan, “they continue to serve as Dayanim who rule, not as arbitrators, so that we follow the majority opinion” (Cheishev Ha’efod 2:17).

I hired Shimon for $100 a week to clean an apartment building once a week. A few weeks later, Levi showed up instead of Shimon to clean the building. Levi cleaned the building for the next couple of weeks, and after some research I discovered that Shimon hired Levi to clean the building for $50 a week.

Q: Am I obligated to pay Shimon $100, or is it acceptable for me to just pay Levi $50?

A: Let us first review similar cases discussed by the Poskim.Reuven gave Shimon thread to weave into cloth for a certain amount of money. Shimon outsourced the job to Levi for a lesser amount. Some Poskim ruled that Shimon must return the difference to Reuven. Reuven agreed to pay the higher amount to Shimon but once Shimon outsourced the job there is no reason he should profit from someone else’s merchandise (oseh sechorah b’parnasso shel chaveiro) (Mabit 3:23 as cited by Minchas Pitim 332:1). However, one could argue that this view applies when Levi’s work is inferior to Shimon’s work. In that case, it is inconceivable that Shimon should be allowed to profit at Reuven’s expense (this qualification can be inferred from Mabit’s explanation).

Some find precedent to our question from the case (C.M. 185:1) of Yehudah who hires Yosef to sell merchandise for $100 and Yosef sells it for $150. Since the merchandise belongs to Yehudah he receives the entire $150 and Yosef has no right to profit from Yehudah’s object (Mabit op. cit.). Others note a fundamental difference between the above two cases. Since Yosef was Yehudah’s agent he may not generate for himself a profit from Yehudah’s merchandise. In contrast, when Reuven hired Shimon to weave a cloth, there is no reason Shimon should not outsource the work to Levi. Since outsourcing is common in many industries, if Levi is willing to take less, why shouldn’t Shimon keep the remaining money? (Beis Yehudah [“Iyash”], C.M. 51).

Furthermore, a contractor hired to do a job is no different from a tenant who, unless there is a reason that the landlord would protest, has the right to sublease the apartment, even if he earns a profit in the process (C.M. 363:10; Avnei Hachoshen 332).

Accordingly, it seems that each case must be considered independently. If there is reason for concern that Levi is not as reliable or will not produce the same quality product, Reuven is not obligated to pay Levi any more than the value of the benefit that he received and certainly not any more than Levi agreed to take for the job (but he may be required to pay Shimon a brokerage fee — Avnei Hachoshen).

In industries where it is common practice to outsource work, Reuven must pay Shimon what he agreed to pay, regardless of what Shimon pays Levi, since it is understood that the work may be outsourced (C.M. 291:22). Even in circumstances in which Reuven does not know that the job will be outsourced, but there is no reason that it should matter to Reuven whether the job is outsourced or not, e.g., in your situation where you saw that Levi was cleaning the building for a number of weeks and did not protest (C.M. 291:22), Reuven must pay Shimon what he agreed to pay him. This is certainly true in your case when the job involves cleaning a building and there is little concern that Levi will take Reuven’s belongings, so that there should not be a question of whether Levi is trustworthy (C.M. 342:1). Therefore, you are obligated to pay Shimon what you agreed to pay him.

Q: We are going away for the holidays. Can we sublet our apartment?

A: Many leases specify whether subletting is permitted or not and with what limitations.

In the absence of an explicit clause or common practice to the contrary, the tenant can sublet, since he “owns” the usage for the duration of the rental. However, he may sublet only to the number of people allowed by the initial lease, not to a larger family or group of people, since extra people cause additional wear and tear. The third party must also be a decent, reliable person (C.M. 316:1; Aruch Hashulchan 316:2; see Kesef Kodashim 316:1).

When the tenant sublet at a higher price than the original rental, if he was allowed to sublet, the profit is his; if he was not allowed, the profit goes to the landlord (Rema 363:10).

One may not sublet movable items to a third party without permission of the owner, since they are easily stolen, and the owner might not trust the third party (C.M. 342:1).