9.11.2016 | |
#187 |
Lech Lecha |
9.11.2016 |
#187 |
Lech Lecha |
Story LineTail-Light TicketRabbi Meir Orlean
“I need a car this evening,” Boruch said to his friend Mendy. “Could I borrow yours?”
“No problem,” replied Mendy. “I get home around 5:00 p.m. You can have the car after that.”
Boruch came at 6:00 p.m. and picked up the car. “Here is the key,” said Mendy. “The registration and insurance are in the glove compartment.”
“Thanks a lot,” said Boruch. “I should be back around 10:30.” He drove off.
Boruch was cruising along when a cop signaled him to pull over. “What does he want?” Boruch wondered. “I’m not doing anything illegal.”
Boruch pulled over at the roadside. “Your tail-light is out,” the cop said. “That’s a violation.”
“It’s not my car,” explained Boruch. “I borrowed it from a friend for the evening and wasn’t aware that the light was out.”
“That’s not a valid excuse,” said the cop. “It’s got to be fixed. I’m issuing a ticket.” He filled out the ticket and handed it to Boruch.
“Mendy didn’t tell me that there was a problem with the tail-light,” Boruch grumbled. “I wonder if he knew about it.”
When Boruch returned, he told Mendy what had happened. “Did you know that the tail-light was not working?” he asked
“Yes, but I’ve been driving like this for a few days and didn’t think of it,” Mendy replied. “I planned to fix it later this week. I guess it’s your tough luck that the cop pulled you over.”
“If you knew about it, you should pay for the ticket!” said Baruch.
“You were the driver, though,” responded Mendy. “Anyway, a borrower is responsible even for oness (uncontrollable circumstances).”
“But you gave me a defective car,” argued Boruch. “I’m not responsible for that!”
The two went to Rabbi Dayan.
“I borrowed a car with the tail-light out and got a ticket,” said Boruch. “Who is responsible to pay the ticket?”
“Since traffic rules are necessary for societal safety, they are subject to dina d’malchusa dina (the law of the land) and the halachah is in accordance,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Thus, whoever was issued the ticket is liable for it. In most places the mechanical condition of the car is the driver’s responsibility; if the ticket was issued in his name he is liable.
“However, in some places the police can issue an ‘owner’s responsibility ticket,’ which falls on the owner. In addition, in some states the fine is irrevocable, whereas in others (e.g., California) it is a ‘fix-it’ ticket, which can be dismissed upon proof of repair” (Rema, C.M. 369:11).
“Would the owner or driver ever be responsible to reimburse the other party for causing the fine?” asked Baruch.
“At most, causing the fine would be grama, for which one is not halachically liable,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “However, there is a chiyuv b’dinei Shamayim (moral obligation) to pay where there was intention to damage or clear negligence.
“Thus, if the ticket was issued to the owner, the driver has no obligation to reimburse him. If the ticket was issued to the driver, the owner could have a moral obligation to reimburse if he knowingly concealed that the tail-light was out” (Rema 386:3; Pischei Choshen, Nezikin 3:39; Halvaah 2:[76]).
“What about the cost of the repair?” asked Mendy.
“The cost of the repair is upon the owner, since it is his car,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “If the ticket was a ‘fix-it’ ticket, the driver is responsible to ensure that the problem was fixed in order to have the ticket dismissed. If he paid for the repair of the car out of his pocket, he would usually be entitled to reimbursement from the owner, since he enhanced the value of the car in a manner that is warranted (yored l’soch sdei chaveiro), unless the owner explicitly instructed him not to repair it” (C.M. 375:1).
From the BHI HotlineRestoration of Hard Drive
My computer crashed. Unfortunately, I had not backed up my files, so I brought the computer to a repair shop. The repairman took my computer and told me that my files would be ready in two days. Later that day a friend informed me that he has the necessary software to recover my files and will do it for free. I returned to the computer store and informed them that a friend would recover my files for free and took my computer that was still on the counter. The owner protested, claiming that once he received the computer for repair he is entitled to repair it for compensation.
Q: Is his claim correct that I cannot cancel the job?
A: The essence of the question is whether giving the computer to the repairman constitutes some sort of kinyan that makes the agreement binding. The same question arises if the repairman (uman) wishes to cancel the agreement (Erech Shai 333:5). There are three opinions regarding this matter.
Some maintain that once the repairman lifts the item he has made a kinyan on the object. Others contend that although he doesn’t have a kinyan on the object, accepting it is considered a kinyan of has’chalas melachah (beginning of employment), which is binding for employment agreements. The third opinion argues that it does not constitute any type of kinyan until he actually started to repair it.
Ritva (B.M. 76b) writes that once a repairman takes physical possession of the object, he has a kinyan in the object and the customer cannot renege on the agreement. Similarly, at that point the repairman may not cancel the agreement and refuse to make the repair (Nesivos 333:1, 10; Mabit 1:176).
Others disagree and argue that taking the object to repair does not constitute a kinyan in the actual object. Since the customer does not owe any money yet, the repairman also does not have a kinyan in the object to serve as security (mashkon) for the money that he anticipates earning (see C.M. 190:9). A borrower (sho’el) and renter (socher) acquire their rights upon taking physical possession of the object because they acquire the rights to use it (peiros). In contrast, a repairman does not acquire the right to use the object he will repair, and thus mere possession does not constitute a kinyan (Erech Shai, Y.D. 380:14; Machaneh Ephraim, Poalim 6). Some further assert that Ritva’s opinion represents a minority position (Ulam Hamishpat 333:1; Chazon Ish, B.K. 23:36).
Some contend that all opinions agree that taking the utensil constitutes the beginning of the repair (has’chalas melachah), which generates a binding agreement with an employee (Machaneh Ephraim, Chazon Ish, op. cit.). Other authorities maintain that the agreement becomes binding only when the repairman begins the actual repair and not when he takes possession of the object (Erech Shai, ibid.).
Moreover, there are Rishonim (Mordechai, B.M. 359) who write explicitly that handing the object to the repairman does not constitute any sort of kinyan and either party may renege on the agreement (Erech Shai, ibid.; Beis Shlomo, C.M. 63; Minchas Pitim 185:4).
[It should be noted that some maintain that the kinyan of has’chalas melachah occurs when the repairman has made at least a perutah’s worth of repair (Ohr Same’ach, Sechirus 9:4). Also, some authorities write that the has’chalas melachah is limited to day workers (poel/sechir yom) rather than contractors (kablan) (Avnei Nezer, C.M. 52; Nachal Yitzchak, 39:17)].
Due to the many types of disagreement, the one who has physical possession of the computer has the upper hand and could either demand payment (the repairman) or refuse to pay (the customer).
Money mattersAcquisition of Aveidah#333
Q: I rented a house with an enclosed yard. Does a lost item (without simanim) that falls in the yard belong to me or the landlord?
A:There is a dispute on this issue. The Rambam (Hil. Sechirus 6:5) maintains that the landlord acquires it, unless there is a practice otherwise, whereas Rashi (B.M. 102a) and the Rosh (Responsa 1:1) maintain that the tenant acquires it, since rental is tantamount to temporary ownership.
There is an apparent contradiction in the Shulchan Aruch, who rules like both the Rosh and the Rambam (C.M. 260:4, 313:3). Some differentiate between items that are expected to be found and those that are not. The Shach (313:1) rejects this distinction and sides with the Rambam. However, other Acharonim side with the Rosh, since this is included in usage of the yard (Ketzos Hachoshen and Pischei Teshuvah 313:1; see also Mishpatecha L’Yaakov #94).
On account of the dispute, whoever takes the item first may keep it. Even according to the Rambam, the tenant acquires the item if this is the common practice.