Tuvia was walking by Mr. Pachman’s house and noticed an almost new toaster oven waiting for garbage collection. It looked like it was in good condition, so Tuvia took it home and tested it; it worked fine.

“Why did you throw out your toaster oven?” Tuvia asked Mr. Pachman.

“It was milchig and someone heated a patty in it,” explained Mr. Pachman. “He thought it was pareve, but the patty turned out to be fleishig. I heard that you can’t kasher a toaster oven.

“I’m not sure that’s always true,” said Tuvia. “When was the oven last used for milchigs?”

“It wasn’t used for a few days,” answered Mr. Pachman.

“How was the patty heated?” asked Tuvia.

“On aluminum foil,” Mr. Pachman answered.

Tuvia looked inside the oven; it was quite clean. “There was barely any splattering,” he said. “I’ll check with Rabbi Isser.”

“Under these circumstances,” said Rabbi Isser, “you can kasher the toaster oven by turning it to the highest setting for half an hour.”

Tuvia called Mr. Pachman and told him what Rabbi Isser had said.

“That’s good to know,” Mr. Pachman said. “If the toaster oven can be kashered, though, I’d like it back.”

“But you threw it out and disowned it,” said Tuvia. “It was waiting to be picked up with the garbage collection. I acquired it from hekfer.”

“But that was a mistake,” said Mr. Pachman. “Had I known that it was possible to kasher the toaster oven I would not have thrown it out.”

“Had I not checked with Rabbi Isser, though, it would have been collected shortly by the sanitation men,” replied Tuvia. “I’m happy to discuss the issue with Rabbi Dayan.”

“If Mr. Pachman threw out a toaster oven because he mistakenly thought that it couldn’t be kashered,” asked Tuvia, “may I keep it?”

“A similar question was posed regarding fat that was disposed of because it was thought to be forbidden cheilev, but was actually permitted shuman,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Similarly, candles that were disposed of because they were thought to contain a forbidden mixture of butter and meat-fat, but later verification confirmed that they contained no butter, were permitted” (Shemen Hamor, C.M. #1; Mor V’ohalos, Y.D. # 4).

“At first glance, it would seem that you should have to return the toaster oven,” continued Rabbi Dayan. “Mr. Pachman threw out the toaster because he thought that he could not kasher it. Tosafos says (Gittin 47a; Pesachim 57a) that hefker (disowning) rooted in error is not hefker, just as a gift or transaction rooted in error is not valid (C.M. 246:1-3).

“Similarly, pe’ah that was mistakenly given to the poor from vegetables that are not obligated in pe’ah are not considered hefker, since the gift was rooted in error” (Pesachim 57a).

“Why do you say ‘at first glance’?” asked Tuvia. “It seems pretty clear.”

“There is a seemingly contradictory source,” said Rabbi Dayan. “The Gemara (Kreisus 24a) teaches that if witnesses testified that an ox gored and killed a person or that a city was an ir nidachas, which renders the property forbidden, and later the witnesses’ testimonies were proven false, whoever seizes the property acquires it. The owner already relinquished ownership of the property, even though it turned out to be rooted in error.”

“How do we resolve this contradiction?” asked Tuvia.

“The issue is somewhat complicated,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “Some differentiate between one who gave to others based on a mistaken reason and one who disowned his property completely where the error is not likely to be discovered, such as in our case. Since the owner fully severed his connection with the property, even if for mistaken reasons, it’s gone if the error is not likely to be clarified.

“Some also compare our situation to yei’ush (abandonment) of lost property. Also, Mr. Pachman could have asked a she’eilah. Thus, you can keep the toaster oven, if you wish” (see Pischei Choshen, Kinyanim 23:[39]; Aveidah 2:[8]).

Following is a letter received regarding a previous response by the Hotline:

In regard to the question about collecting interest awarded by a secular court and whether the plaintiff may take that interest to cover his court and attorney costs (see BW 321 of Parashas Devarim), the response was that when he is halachically entitled to collect expenses, he is permitted to take the money and should inform the other party that he accepted the money to cover his court costs and not as interest.

I was perplexed by this ruling. The Gemara (Nazir 23a) states that someone who intends to eat chazir and unknowingly eats lamb’s meat requires atonement. Tosafos (Kiddushin 32a, d.h. d’machil) writes that someone who causes another to perform an action which the second person believes is forbidden, but which in reality is not (as described above), is in violation of lifnei iver — causing another person to sin.

Therefore, if the person collecting his court costs allows the second person to think that he is paying ribbis, he violates lifnei iver. The fact that the other party now knows that it was not interest does not undo what has already transpired. To avoid this transgression, the second party needs to be informed in advance that the money is not being collected as interest.

A: Thank you for giving us the opportunity to elaborate on this issue (which is actually based on Minchas Shlomo 2:68:[8]). 

Later authorities, in fact, derive from Tosafos the prohibition against misleading someone into doing something that he thinks is prohibited, even though he is mistaken regarding the prohibition (Chofetz Chaim 1, Klal 4[46]; cf. Ritva to Kiddushin and Yosef Ometz 87:2). One example is secluding oneself (yichud) with someone when he knows that it is permitted but the other person is unaware of the circumstances that permit seclusion, e.g., a woman who does not realize that her husband is in town (Minchas Shlomo 1:35:[4]; see also Torah Lishmah 407 and Minchas Shlomo 3:105:[9]).

However, there are several reasons why it seems that this issue does not apply in this situation. (See also Minchas Shlomo 1:7 for another possible reason.) One reason is that the party paying interest is being forced (oness) to do so by the court, and one who is forced to violate a prohibition is not in need of forgiveness (Rema, Y.D. 185:4). Some Poskim state that when one is forced there is no actual violation, and consequently, lifnei iver is not violated (Pri Megadim, A.A. 266:6; Machaneh Chaim 1:46).

Although other authorities contend that the prohibition of lifnei iver applies even when the violator is compelled to violate the prohibition (Kovetz Shiurim, Kesubos 12 and Igros Moshe, Y.D. 1:3), it seems that their position applies when an actual issur is violated (albeit b’oness). When no actual issur is violated and the only issue is his impression that he is violating a prohibition, the issue does not apply when he is forced.

Another reason is that the litigants never had a ribbis agreement and from the payer’s perspective he is being “robbed” since he is forced to pay because of the court-imposed “interest” penalty. However, since the one collecting the money has the halachic right to that money, it is not categorized as stolen money. [According to this explanation, if one suspects that the other party is paying interest willingly, he should be notified that the money is to cover expenses rather than ribbis.] The reason to mention that the money was collected to cover court costs is to remove the chillul Hashem that could result if he thinks that the other party collected ribbis.

Q: I rented a car for the weekend, but was unable to return it on time due to a blizzard. Do I have to pay for the extra day?

A: This depends on the terms of the rental contract. In an informal rental, without an explicit clause, if the price was linked solely to time, the renter is liable for the extra day. The rental agreement was for the time he had the car, so that the reason for the delay is irrelevant and there is no claim of oness (circumstances beyond one’s control).

However, if the car was rented for a stated purpose and the price was fixed accordingly, if the oness was related to that purpose and the renter was not expected to know of the potential problem, he is not liable for the extra day. Thus, if the car was rented to drive to a certain place and unexpected weather there prevented returning on time, he is exempt from additional payment (C.M. 310:3; Pischei Choshen, Sechirus 2:22-25).